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F O R E W O R D 
The current paper, as the acknowledgement note indicates, 
arises out of a joint CSSSC and Roskilde University Project on 
'Institutional framework for industrial development'. Dr. Tarun 
Kabiraj, a young economist who has done interesting work on the 
theoretical treatment of technology transfer, was requested by the 
Centre to prepare a paper on ' Intellectual Property Rights and TRIPs' 
in the light of accepted economic theory. The current paper is a 
result of that Dr. Kabiraj has taken into account much of the 
theoretical literature while preparing the paper. However, the 
implementation of laws such as those related to intellectual property 
rights requires an investigation in detail of the institutions through 
which the implementation takes place. It is well known that China, 
Japan and other east Asian countries have been quite skilful in 
adopting international laws and yet interpreting them according to 
theiro wn perceived interest and have defeated strategies of penetration 
into their economies by western multinationals. In judging the 
applicability of various theoretical expctati'ons in the Indian context, 
we have to remember that the Indian economy and society are far 
more transparent to the gaze of the foreigners than typical east Asian 
countries. Dr. Kabiraj's conclusions must be evaluated in the light 
of such institutional peculiarities that distinguish India from China, 
Japan, South Korea, etc. A paper on the working of the Indian 
Patents' Act which is a follow-up of the earlier work done at the 
Centre is in preparation and will also be published in the near 
future. 
29 June 1994 (Amiya Kumar Bagchi) 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRIPS AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER* 
1. Introduction 
North-south polarisation has never been so prominent on any 
other issue than the one at present on intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). The inclusion of IPRs in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTN) under the General Agreement on 
Tari ffs and Trade (G ATT) has created a stir among the developing 
countries, because it is feared that it would violate all international 
norms and codes of conduct and would provide absolute power to 
the developed countries to rule over the developing countries in 
the future on trade and technology matters. This will have far-
reaching implications for the selfsufficiency and long-term growth 
performance of the developing countries. The puipose of this 
paper is to throw some light on this issue. 
One of the major issues of the Uruguay Round talks under 
GATT is to provide protection to intellectual property -(IP) 
worldwide. Traditionally, GATT limited its discussion on issues 
related specifically to tariffs and trade in goods, with an overall 
objective of free and fair trade among it5 member nations. The 
setting of norms and standards of IPRs was the subject of the 
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World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). However the 
developed countries, and in particular the US, had been pressine 
to introduce the whole range of IP issues, including patents 
trademarks, copy rights etc., within the ambit of the GATT Thev 
argue that IPRs are trade related, and so there should be a GATT 
based agreement on IPRs so that trade distortions can be reduccd 
«f not eliminated. Accordingly, they argue, inadequate and 
ineffective protection provided to intellectual properties in several 
countries has given rise to production and trade in counterfeit 
goods; so 'fair ' conduct of trade has been violated. Hence they 
demand that GATT should call for international enforcement of 
the trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) by setting 
norms and standards applicable to all GATT members. 
There was much dissension and difference of opinion on 
different aspects of the issue of intellectual property protection 
and patent protection in particular, not only among the developed 
and develop,ng countries but also within developed and developing 
nations. So to conclude the Uruguay Round talks, Mr Arthur 
Dunkel, the then Director General pf GATT offered a draft 
proposal (known as the Dunkel Draft) in 1991 on a 'take it or leave 
n basis. Finally in December 1993, the member countries have 
signed the draft. Now it is very important to understand implications 
of the new changes. We provide theoretical underpinnings of the 
problenioflPRs in the context of international technology transfer 
(11) and research and development ( R & D ) . 
is w h v r T ™ q u e a i o n ftat i s o f t e n oln, H ^ f , O S e n f 0 r l h i S p u , p o s e T h e i n d u s ' r i a l i s e d coumnes had forlong been dominant in the international scene In 
p 0 S t S e c o n d W o r l d War period the developing countries 
orgamsed themselves as the Group of 77 (G- 77) and initiated in 
the Un, ted Nauons and in UNCTAD a wide series of negotiations 
l h e w e s I a n d a i m e d « establishing a New International 0 
Economic Order (NIEO). However, the developing countries had a 
very bad decade during the 1980s, with growing budgetary deficit, 
external debt and balance of payments crisis. To overcome the crisis 
they were forced to borrow from the IMF and the World Bank and 
surrender to their structural adjustment programme. Given the 
difficulties and disadvantages of the south, the west launched the 
Uruguay Round of Negotiations in the GATT. The United Nations 
and the UNCTAD—the universal fora for the north-south negotiations 
are left behind, and the GATT, an obscure and sleepy organization, 
so far limiting its role in tariff negotiations only, has been resurrected 
for making most far reaching negotiations which were mostly out of 
its scope and competence. The GAIT, a club of the rich like the IMF 
and the World Bank, was chosen because the developing countries 
did not have the advantage of being organised there, as in UN or in 
G-77 (Patel, 1992). 
To the extent IP issues are not directly trade issues, the Uruguay 
Round, it is stated, has included, not all IP issues generally, but only 
trade-related ones, i.e., TRIPs. In practice, however, in an 
interdependent world economy,with all countries being exposed to 
foreign trade, it is hard to isolate the one which is not trade related 
(Deardorff, 1990). So far the GATT's objective has been to promote 
free international flow of goods in trade, with this perspective one 
might be prone to extend a similar analysis to the cases of IPs and 
argue for free international flow of ideas. In this sense TRIPs as an 
agenda in the Uruguay Round is contradictory to the spirit of the 
GATT. However, the proponents of the TRIPs negotiations argue 
that protection of IP is needed to permit the owners of that property 
to export the products that embody their innovations, and hence IP 
protection is pro-trade. 
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2. Role of Technology in International T rade and Technology 
Transfer 
It is unnecessary to elaborate on the importance of technology in 
the growth and dynamism of a country. The role of the technology 
factor in international trade has also been long recognized in the 
literature (Jones, 1970, Markusen and Svensson, 1985, UNCTAD, 
1989). In this section we just pinpoint the role of technology in 
international competitiveness. 
The world economy has undergone a major change. A growing 
volume of world trade in the last few decades cannot be explained by 
the traditional resource based comparative advantage trade theory. 
Also the intra-firm trade across nations is inconsistent in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework. The traditional theory is based on a 
number of simplifying assumptions like diminishing returns or 
increasing costs, perfect competition or impersonal market force, 
absenceof externalities and identical technological knowledge across 
countries. But once we bring the technology factor, scale economies 
due to high fixed costs or sunk costs in the fonm of R & D expenditure 
associated with technology generation, play an important role, 
leading to falling unit costs. Market size, transport costs, location of 
plants etc. become important factors. Also strategic factors like entry 
barriers or sales promotion measures, and respective governments' 
(strategic) interventionist policies feature in international trade. It is 
no longer a situation of perfect competition. A firm by differentiating 
its product sufficiently (or just by using its brand name) can earn 
economic rents for a substantial period in a market without inducing 
the entry of rivals. Externalities may exist because of positive feed-
back or spillover effects on productive efficiency of the upstreams 
and downstreams firms. And most importantly, significant interfirm 
technological differences exist in the same industry among different 
countries which create different cost advantages. Competitive 
advantage can also be created through the accumulation of experience 
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(learning by doing), initiating a successful R & D programme, 
technology transfer from firms in the same or other industries, and 
through imitative research. Thus much of the volume and growth of 
trade is explained by international technology gaps resulting in 
important intercountry variation in techniques used and product 
characteristics. The size of these gaps is determined by international 
differences in innovative capabilities, access to innovation, corporate 
strategies and institutional conditions, including government policies 
(UNCTAD, 1989). 
The developing countries are at a disadvantage in respect of 
resource endowment , population growth and international 
competition. In such a situation the development and use of modern 
technologies is thought to be the simplest way by which the less 
developed countries (LDCs) can overcome the impasse of 
development. However, given the resource constraint, both human 
and physical, technologically backward economies are hardly in a 
position to acquire modern production knowledge and meet the 
developmental needs by their own efforts. Given that most of the 
advanced knowledge.and technologies are developed and located in 
the north, it is thought that the LDCs can benefit from this advanced 
knowledge and experience and reduce the developmental gap vis-a-
vis the advanced nations. Technology transfer is a way by which the 
backward economies can acquire the scientific knowledge and 
technology from the north and initiate a process of economic 
development of their own. Multinational or transnational companies 
are considered most important agents in transferring such resources 
and knowledge from the developed to the less developed nations 
(Caves, 1982). One variant of the north-south models of technology 
transfer that has drawn much attention in the theoretical and empirical 
literature is the 'product cycle hypothesis'. This explains a trade 
pattern between the north and the south, where new goods are 
innovated in the north and the north exports new goods and°the south 
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exports old goods, keeping this trade pattern unchanged, although 
product-mix is always undergoing a change. In course of lime, this 
affects world income distribution as well. This work is initiated by 
Vernon (1966) and then it has been extended, among others, by 
Krugman (1979) and Dollar (1986). 
Technological change affects the competitiveness of a country's 
industry through innovation and diffusion ( i. e„ imitation and 
technology transfer). The more rapid the change, the greater is the 
level of technological capacity required to stay competitive. Some 
developing countries through the operation of such mechanism have 
already achieved success in various lines of production. Japan is an 
outstanding example (Ozawa, 1985). Once dependent upon foreign 
technologies through a sequence of well-defined government policies, 
Japan has emerged as one of the most industrially advanced nations 
in the world. In the group of Third World countries, the experience 
of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong with foreign 
capital investment and technology have much to justify this point 
(World Development Report, 1991). However, most of the developing 
countries have not been so successful. Success generally depend? on 
the combination of the educational level, technical skill, manufacturing 
expertise, organizational and marketing capabilities, degree of 
institutional reforms and dynamic attitudes toward new changes. 
These in turn determine their ability to adopt, imitate and further 
develop the imported technologies. Mostof the developing countries 
are often lacking in this kind of environment. This also limits their 
ability to make domestic savings available for investment and 
acquire more modem technologies needed for gaining a competitive 
edge in export markets. 
3. IPRs and Technology Transfer 
It is easy to understand the economics underlying IPRs in the 
context of a closed economy. On the one hand, patent protection 
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hinders dissemination of available knowhow and therefore, depresses 
social efficiency; on the other hand, the absence of some form of 
protection leaves little incentive to private investors for innovation 
and further development. It calls for a balance between protection of 
IPRs and social efficiency (Nordhaus, 1969, Scherer, 1980). 
Intellectual property protection is a compromise between shortrun 
deadweight loss and longrun gain of welfare. 
But in the context of the world economy the above compromise 
is much more complex. It is easier to enforce property rights 
nationally, but enforcing it internationally is very costly because of 
the ineffective enforcement mechanism, and often impossible in the 
absence of the cooperation of the host governments due to the lack 
of dispute settlement mechanisms (Benko, 1987, Levin, 1986). It 
also involves appropriability problem (Magee, 1981, Teece,1981). 
Let us assume that all innovations take place in the north. If foreign 
IPs are protected by the governments of the south, the northern firms 
will gaina comparative advantage over the southern rivals. Otherwise, 
the firms in thesouth will pirate the innovation and become equal 
competitors in the international market place (see Mansfield, 1985, 
Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). This would increase welfare in the 
south at the cost of the north. Mansfield (1988) noted, 
In many cases, the United States has been responsible for 
the basic research and the original inventions underlying 
a major innovation, but much of the profits has gone to 
firms in other countries, such as Japan, that have imitated, 
adopted and improved the innovation (p. 16). 
The U. S. International Trade Commission (1988) and the 
International Anti-Counterfeiting coalition estimated billions of 
dollars losses of US sales and export due to inadequate protection of 
intellectual property rights (see Benko, 1987). On the other hand, if 
intellectual property protection all over the world is granted, even if 
we forget other costs, there is a redistributional cost to the developing 
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economics. For example, suppose from the world's perspective the 
benefits and costs together balance out, there will still be a transfer 
of welfare from consumers in protected markets to the monopoly 
inventors or producers. 
The above paragraph explains the source of conflicts and the 
complexities of the problem with IPRs. Developing countries are of 
the view that intellectual propeny rights over new innovations give 
inventors and innovators an undesirable monopoly that hinders the 
development efforts of the former and tends to prolong their poveny 
and low per capita income. Hence they demand that knowledge 
should be made available at the least possible cost to every one. But 
industrialised nations do not agree with this view. Accordingly, they 
argue, IPRs should be respected so that the private investors who take 
substantial risks in developing and commercialising new technologies 
can get fair returns from the innovations. In the absence of this, there 
will be little incentive for inventive and innovative activity, and it 
will ultimately impair the interests of all nations. Diwan and Rodrik 
(1991) have described the controversy on IPRs between the north and 
the south. Chin and Grossman (1990) have studied incentives that a 
government in the south has to protect the IPRs of a northern firm and 
have constructed models to compare welfare in each country with or 
without southern protection of northern IPRs. There are also situations 
where southern protection leads to a fall in global welfare (see Chin 
and Grossman, 1990, and Maskus 1990). If we now include equity 
and distributional considerations, the welfare implication of this 
situation is more likely to go against the poorest countries. 
Intellectual properties are products of human intellect; so they 
are inherently intangible and abstract in nature. IPRs are the legal 
expression of the privileges granted by the state to the inventors or 
innovators for the use of their creations. It relates to items of 
knowledge and to information which can eventually be incorporated 
or embodied in an unlimited number of copies of tangible things, 
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machines, artifacts or goods, at the same time and in different 
geographical places all over the world (Bifani, 1990). 
IPRs include both industrial property rights and copyrights. 
Industrial property rights are the rights granted to any new inventive 
solutions, including the design and appearance of products and 
processes. And copyrights refer to the privilege granted to make a 
copy of literary or artistic creations. Thus copyright protects works 
from being copied. 
While industrial property rights can be in the form of patents, 
trademarks, brand names, industrial design etc., economists often 
deal with patents only. Patents give exclusive rights to move, use or 
sell a particular application of an innovation; at the same time it 
carries an obligation to disclose the invention to the public (after 
some finite time period). It is, therefore, a mechanism for the 
diffusion of technology. Copyrights favour and encourage 
dissemination of information. We have already noted the important 
role of technology in international trade and in shaping the pattern of 
trade. The relative technological capabilities of firms and countries 
define their ability to create dynamic comparative advantage and 
international competitiveness. It determines to what extent a country 
will participate in the global economic system. It also determines the 
rate of growth (see Bifani, 1990). 
It may be noted that protection of property rights is given only 
for a limited time span. This is a departure from the traditional legal 
concept that gives protection for unlimited time. Society chooses a 
time limit to harmonise private and social interests. If the patent life 
is too long, the burden (deadweight loss) would be too great. In 
economic theory the optimal patent life is determined on the basis of 
a trade-off between the social loss caused by the temporary monopoly 
and the social benefits of the application of the new knowledge (see 
Reinganum, 1989, for this literature). 
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The traditional intellectual property system retains its "national" 
character in the sense that countries have the freedom to legislate in 
accordance with their own social, cultural and economic characteristics 
and development objectives. This is discouraging to the creators of 
new knowledge because the intellectual property has the distinctive 
feature that it transcends geographical and national boundaries much 
more easily than tangible properties. 
In the traditional intellectual property system there is a provision 
to avoid the abuse of monopoly powers and guarantee effective 
dissemination of knowledge. The legal instruments arc sublicensing 
and compulsory licensing. This is a sanction imposed upon the 
owner of the IPR should he fail to fulfil the obligation to work the 
protected invention. 
However, the increasing internationalization of the world 
economy brings a threat to this traditional IPR system. Nowadays, 
R & D decisions are largely defined by global, rather than national, 
considerations and expectations, given the fact that R & D involves 
huge amounts of expense. Consequently there has been a growing 
demand in the industrial countries for a conclusion on agreement to 
upgrade and harmonize international protection standards and 
enforcement. The WIPO has no enforcement power or dispute-
setUement mechanisms. It is in this background that IPRs have been 
kept as subject of GATT. The new GATT rules on intellectual 
property protection are known as trade related intellectual property 
rights. In the next section we seek to understand the implication of 
TRIPs in relation to IPRs in general. To be more precise, ourquestion 
is: Does TRIPs mark a reversal from the earlier negotiations where 
the issue was how to make technology transfer between the north 
and the south more equitable ? 
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4. TRIPs Vs. Traditional IPRs 
The last section has discussed the context of the GATT based 
approach to IPRs in the context of international technology transfer. 
In this section we discuss the features of TRIPs and to what extent it 
is a departure from the traditional IPRs. As we see, it calls for 
fundamental changes in the international patent system. 
The Paris Convention, revised time to time, had orov'ded an 
international framework for the protection of industrial property. 
While it was not obligatory for all the countries to join the Paris 
Convention, the developed countries, in particular the USA, the EEC 
and Japan, have always initiated moves to compel the developing 
countries to join the Convention.However, the acceptance of TRIPs 
under new GATT rules does not only imply automatic joining of the 
Paris Convention, it also calls for stronger terms and conditions for 
the developing countries. It is to be noted that there were twenty 
countries including India, who were members of the GATT but not 
of the Paris Convention. India not only took the lead but after a very 
careful consideration set up rules and enacted the Indian Patents Act 
1970. This law became the model for many developing countries. 
The important feature of this model is that it gave priority to national 
interests over those of foreign firms. Hence it is necessary to study to 
what extent TRIPs under GATT is contradictory to the traditional 
IPRs (i. e. Paris Convention) and a departure from the Indian Patents 
Actl970. The studies by Keayla, Dhar and Rao (1993), and Rao 
(1989) are partly helpful in understanding the problem. 
The mandate of the Negotiating Group regarding TRIPs reads: 
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to 
international trade, and taking into account the need to 
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and to ensure thatmeasures and procedures 
to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves 
1 1 " -
becomc barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall 
aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as 
appropriate new rules and disciplines. 
With this purpose in mind, GATT has framed a distinct set of 
rules and procedures for intellectual property protection (i. e. TRIPs), 
to be mandatorily adopted as a standard by all the GATT members. 
Obviously, under the new GATT rules, the flexibilities enjoyed by 
countries within existing rules of the Paris convention will cease to 
exist. 
Trade relatedness underlying TRIPs implies that it has an impact 
on international trade flows. It is argued by the developed countries 
that trade distortions arise due to 'inadequate protection' of patent 
rights. The patent laws of the developing countries are compared 
with those of the developed countries. Then inadequacy means not 
having a high level of patent protection as prescribed by the developed 
countries (Rao, 1989). An important departure of new GATT rules 
from the traditional IPRs is seen particularly in respect of national 
treatment, working of a patent, its coverage and duration of patent 
life. All these have implications which we discuss briefly below. 
National Treatment 
Both the Paris Convention and the new GATT provide for 
national treatment, but there is a fundamental difference in 
interpretation. While the Paris Convention relates national treatment 
to persons, the GATT relates to goods. That is, in the Paris Convention, 
whatever rights and obligations are provided in the patent laws for the 
nationals are also applicable to foreigners, but under GATT, in 
respect of sales, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, no 
discrimination will be made between foreign and domestically 
produced goods. Thus under GATT there will be no discrimination 
against imports. Any provision of the patent system that restricts free 
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imports is regarded as trade distorting. The patent holder in such a 
situation will have an inherent right and propensity to import. It is to 
be noted that most of the patents in force in the world are held by 
nationals of the developed countries, and only a very insignificant 
proportion is owned by nationals of the developing countries 
(Dunning, 1994). This has important implications. There will not be 
much scope of learning by doing. Given the effect of strong brand 
names, consumed will prefer foreign products and local adopters 
will have restricted entry in the market. As firms will not get much 
scope of doing research on the imported product, imitative and 
adaptive activities will be suspended to a large extent. In such a 
situation the importing country will get no opportunity to adopt 
modem technologies even after the expiry of a patent. This leads to 
perpetual dependence on foreign products. Local resources would 
remain unutilised, unemployment would mount. Aggregate income 
would fall. Related to this national treatment is the working of the 
patent. 
Working of the Patent 
Under the Revision of the Paris Convention, the patentee is 
obliged to work the patent, that is, to use the patent for commercial 
exploitation in the patent granting country, but importation of the 
patented product was never considered as working of the patent. Also 
to stop the abuse of the patent right from the non-working of the 
patent, the patent granting authority was given the power to license 
the patent to anyone who was willing to work it. This provision 
ensured a balance between rights and obligations of the patentee 
(UNCTAD, 1988a). However, the spirit of the new GATT provision 
is to rule out-compulsory licensing, and it has introduced 4 importation 
as working of the patent'. It states, 
....patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of the innovation, the field of 
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technology and whether products arc imported or locally 
produced. 
Technological development and technology transfer arc possible 
only if the patent is worked in the patent granting country. Using 
patent as an import monopoly will certainly have an adverse impact 
on industrialisation and innovation in these countries and we should, 
therefore, fight tooth and nail to delete this clause. A foreign patentee 
will not generally be interested in working all the patents in the 
developing countries. This will increase the number of 'sleeping 
patents'. The countries will be deprived of the benefits of these 
patents. Grant of patent monopoly will work against flows of foreign 
investment and technology, and also restrict their technological 
advance through imitation and adaptation. Note the contradictory 
views - while the developed countries consider compulsory licensing 
as trade distorting, the developing countries use this as a guard to 
avoid abuse of patenting and monopoly. In fact, trade based approach 
means that all the countries regard imports as working. This is a 
major and fundamental departure.from the existing patent system. It 
is important to kpep in mind that the overwhelming majority of 
patents in the world are taken out in the G7 countries and most of the 
effective patents are held by the transnational firms of those countries. 
Coverage 
The Paris Convention did not restrict the member states to 
choose the coverage of patentability. As a result various countries 
have excluded certain fields of technology from patenting. These are 
agricultural machinery, fertilisers, chemical products, nuclear 
inventions and pharmaceutical products. Particularly, pharmaceutical 
and food products were excluded from patenting on considerations 
of public health. But the lack of coverage of patents to certain fields 
of technology is considered by the developed countries as trade 
distortion. Dunkel Draft on TRIPs reads,".... patents shall be available 
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for inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology". With this provision it also covers selected forms of life 
which were hitherto not considered patentable by most countries. As 
regards plant varieties, the Dunkel Draft provides that protection has 
to be provided "ei ther by patents or by an effective sui -generis system 
or by any combination thereof' . So now farms will have to pay 
royalties to the original plant breeders. 
Farmers will have to pay higher prices for the seeds. However, 
given the possibility of recycling of crops, possibly these will be one 
time payments. Keeping aside a part from the production and use or 
resale of seeds within themselves from this stock may not possibly be 
inconsistent with new GATT rules. Also at this stage it is not clear to 
what extent enforcing patent rules in case of plants, trees or cattle will 
be possible. However, the provision of product patenting will certainly 
affect the reproduction of hybrid seeds, given the threat of patent 
infringement. Patenting biotechnological inventions or micro-
organism might have lot of implications in respect of domestic 
research, price and cost in the developing countries (Buchanan, 
1993). The giant ^ multinationals and other firms of G-7 countries 
already hold hundreds of patents in genetically engineered micro-
organisms and plant and animal varieties, whereas patenting of these 
has so far not been allowed under the Indian Patents Act of 1970. So 
Indian firms do not hold such patents in India. This means that under 
the new provision anybody who wants to use any method or micro-
organism that has already been patented will have to seek a licence 
from the patentee and pay royalties (Bagchi, 1994). 
Process vs. Product Patenting 
Product innovation implies creation of new goods and services, 
and process innovation reduces the cost of producing existing products. 
So product protection implies protection of the new active compound 
or the good itself, irrespective of the method by which they are 
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produced or the form or manner in which they are used or sold. But 
process protection implies that only chemical methods by which an 
active substance is produced can be protected (Laudien, 1986). 
Two areas where patents play a very important role are chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals. In many countries, however,the products arc 
not patented, although most of the countries protect process 
innovations. For example, for the chcmical industry including drugs 
and pharmaceuticals India has so far allowed process patenting. This 
has helped Indian firms to find out more efficient and cheaper 
methods of production. It is to be noted that process patenting never 
targets to inhibit international trade, however it aims not to inhibit 
research in the development of alternative processes. But the developed 
countries consider process patent as inefficient and amounting to 
trade distortion. Perhaps they regard patent right as an 'individual 
right' and so criticise limited coverage of patents as a limitation of 
individual freedom and also as being trade distorting (Rao, 1989). 
Patenting products would block the development of the product by 
another process, and therefore, stop reverse engineering and catching 
up efforts by technological followers. It will influence power of the 
products and affect the research that is going on in these fields of 
technology. 
As a plea to repair the weakness of IPR protection through 
process patenting the new GATT rules on TRIPs have prescribed 
'product-by-process protection' and the 'reversal of the burden of 
proof', and to ensure the change from process to product patenting a 
ten year transitional period is made available to those countries 
seeking this change. Product-by-process protection means that the 
process protection is extended to the product when it comes from the 
patented process. In countries with product-by-process protection, 
the importation of a product made abroad by a process patented in the 
importing country constitutes an act of infringement (Laudien, 
1986). In the traditional patent infringement legislation, the patentee 
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or plaintiff was to prove that the alleged infringer was using the 
patented invention. But under the 'reversal of the burden of proof 
now it is the alleged infringer who has to prove that he or his agent 
is not using the patented process. 
Therefore, the new provision of IPRs has relieved the,pai£ni£e_ 
from producing any proof of infringement of his process patent. He 
can just sue the user and ask the defendant to prove that the latter is 
innocent. It will discourage investment in R & D for alternative 
processes because there is a potential threat that the investor may be 
sued for infringement of the patented process. Innovating alternative 
processes to produce the home product is prohibited by the clause of 
product patent. Even innovation of different products involves 
threats of infringement of patented inputs or processes. In countries 
like India, this means that producers using novel processes in the 
patented chemicals and drugs, will have to prove that they are not 
infringing any patent rights.In such a situation, given the provision 
of a transitional period of 10 years, it is an open question to what 
extent the firms in the developing countries can reap the benefit. 
Keayla and Dhar (1993) argue that the process, patent regime 
practically becomes infructuous and non-operative. The countries 
will have to largely depend on imports. It is feared that the lead of 
Indian pharmaceutical industry will soon be exhausted and in the 
future this industry will have to be confined to old off-patent 
products. 
There might be some counter-arguments as well. First of all, 
product innovation is far more costly compared to process innovation. 
Product patenting is an effective means to protect the interests of the 
product innovators. Secondly, when process .patenting is available 
the inventor makes all-out efforts for every conceivable operable 
synthesis, often based on insignificant change of the compound. In 
some ways it is a waste of resources. This type of 'detour-research^, 
does not contribute to the development of the local industry. Under 
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a process patent system the patent office is overloaded with all these 
useless patent applications for alternative processes which neither 
represent technical progress nor be ever used. 
The product patent holder enjoys absolute monopoly to make 
and sell the product. However a meaningful process innovation may 
be accommodated within product-patent-structurc by the use of cross 
licensing. For example, if someone invents an improved process — 
which is a real improvement, and not merely a 'detour' process based 
on insignificant changes of parameters— he should get a patent for 
the process but he is not entitled to produce the product without 
authorization by the patentee. Similarly, the owner of the product 
patent is not entitled to use the improved process without proper 
consent of the holder of the process patent. In such a situation both 
the product and process holders can benefit through collaboration by 
cross-licensing each other's patents. This should be optimal (a 
second best) for the society as a whole. 
Patent Life 
Patent life is an important ijssue. It is a trade-off between the 
provision of incentives and social costs of monopoly. A longer patent 
term will give the patentee a longer monopoly advantage, and a very 
short time may not provide the needed incentive. There is a lot of 
literature on the question of the optimum patent life. Historically, 
there has been no consensus as to what the duration of a patent should 
be. Paris Convention leaves individual members free to decide on the 
period of protection they wish to provide under their respective 
national laws. India, not being a member of the Pans Convention, 
stipulated a fourteen year patent period in general, and a seven year 
patent period for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Theoretically, there are many factors to be considered while 
determining the optimal life of a patent. These are the cost of research 
and development, the importance of the innovation, the market size, 
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availability of alternatives, the threat of imitation, the rate of 
obsolescence, and the speed at which the patented product will 
ensure adequate returns to the patentee. Of course, these vary from 
country to country and product to product. So the differentiated 
patent term seems rational. In most of the countries only a few factors 
are considered, and a standard patent term for all patents is decided. 
This means, that both trivial inventions and important inventions are 
treated equally. 
In such a situation in the context of the international economy, 
given that countries differ in respect of social and cultural habits and 
customs, educational levels and factor endowments, a uniform 
duration of 20 years patent term under TRIPs for all technologies and 
for all countries seem grossly irrational, and there is no explanation 
how that magic figure of 20 years patent term comes up. The 
problems with this provision are as follows. First, it does not consider 
the country-specific conditions at all. In the interests of the developing 
countries, patent term should be smaller so that patents can be 
exploited after their expiry. Secondly, in a world of rapid technological 
changer technologies are becoming rapidly obsolete. No patented 
technology is expected to last this long. Third, a longer patent term 
gives the patentee smaller incentives to start production as soon as 
possible. The economy might even be deprived of use of some 
important innovations. This would create the problem of sleeping 
patents. 
Our evaluation of TRIPs in the above paragraphs clearly reveals 
the dimension of the problem with IPRs. The developed countries are 
of the view that trade distortions arise because of disparities present 
in the patent protection under different legislations. In the Paris 
Convention, patents are territorial rights, they are enforceable only in 
the country of grant. Different countries have different laws, depending 
on theirperceptions about the role of patents in their overall economic 
development. These are also based on the conditions prevailing in the 
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respective countries. So in some sense the proposal-set made under 
TRIPs is an attempt to unify all patent laws at a very high level of 
protection. However, given that the economic and technological 
development of countries vary widely, the harmonisation of patent 
laws amounts to asking the developing countries to adopt the system 
that is being adopted by the technologically advanced countries, 
obviously, countries at different stages of technological development 
will not benefit equally from the same system of patent protection. It 
is feared that the LDC enterprises will not be able to take significant 
advantage of the incentive provided by intellectual property protection, 
because it is very unlikely that they will be able to acquire and adopt 
foreign technology without reference to its creator, or to import new 
products or processes from alternative and cheaper sources 
(UNCTAD, 1988b). In view of increasing costs (and risks) of R & D, 
the innovators ask for integrating the world market. As most of the 
R & D takes place in the developed countries, the new provision of 
the patent system would mean that the world market would support 
R & D of the developed countries. This would lead to further 
concentration of R & D in the developed countries. 
5. Price Implications of TRIPs 
We discuss the problem with reference to Indian pharmaceutical 
products. Prices of the pharmaceutical products in India are amongst 
the lowest in the world. This is thought to be an outcome of the Indian 
Patents Act 1970. In a paper Mehrotra (1989) has studied the impact 
of the Indian Patents Act 1970 on the development and performance 
of the pharmaceutical industry. It is argued that the Act has made a 
balance between the rights of the patentee (the inventor) and the 
welfare of the people (public interest). The provision of licensing and 
compulsory licensing has prevented the patentee (with patented 
product) from gaining absolute monopoly in the Indian market. 
Neither is importation considered as working of the patent, nor is 
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product patenting allowed for the pharmaceutical industry. This has 
prevented the patentee from charging an exorbitant price for the 
product. This has helped in providing drug security in the country and 
the industry has succeeded in getting access to foreign markets 
(Keayla and Dhar, 1993). In fact, the availability of process patenting 
has helped Indian firms to develop alternative innovative processes 
in a competitive environment and has resulted in lowering cost of 
production and in lowering prices for the product. This has given the 
Indian firms a competitive edge over foreign rivals. 
But the provision of TRIPs seems to erode the competitive 
advantage of the Indian firms. Absolute monopoly of the foreign 
patent holder would prevail, because under the new rules imitation 
and improvement of the production method will be totally restricted. 
The provision of the reversal of burden of proof would discourage 
further research and development. The main impact would be on the 
prices of pharmaceutical drug products. It is feared that prices will 
jump up at high levels at par with other countries. In the following 
table (drawn from Keayla and Dhar, 1993) price differences across 
countries are highlighted. The two drugs are marketed by the same 
MNCs in four countries, and except India where there is process 
patent, in other countries, viz., Pakistan, the UK, and the USA there 
is product patent regime for medicines. 
Price differences for selected drugs between 
India and selected countries 
Drug Brand Company India Pak. UK USA 
Ranitidine Zantac Glaxo 29.03 260.40 481.31 744.65 
300 mg 
Diclafenac Voveran Ciba 5.67 55.80 95.84 239.47 
50 mg 
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Price difference seems to reflect high trade margins. There arc 
plenty of examples of over-charging. To take a case at random, for 
the product Baralgan Ketone, the declared price of the product 
produced by an MNC was put at over Rs. 24,000 per Kg., whereas it 
was estimated that the fair price with return inclusive of all costs and 
selling and distribution expenses should be Rs. 1810.20 per Kg.. 
(Keayla and Dhar, 1993). 
The foregoing analysis is not conclusive. It is, however, quite 
generally believed that prices of drugs will go up, because that is the 
way the innovators or owners of patents desire to recoup their 
expenses or increase theirpro fits. But thisnever leads to the conclusion 
that prices must rise to the levels comparable to other nations. 
Aggregate demand and elasticity factors, and income distribution are 
important factors in making any comparison. Again, convening 
foreign drug prices into rupees will give a misleading picture of 
comparison. In fact, it may not be very difficult to explain the high 
prices (and profits) in the pharmaceutical industry in the developed 
countries (in particular, in the USA). [See Scherer(1993) fordetails.] 
First of all, pharmaceutical drugs have the distinctive feature 
that the consumer and the consumption decision maker are different 
persons—while the drug products are consumed by the consumers, 
the decision to consume a particular drug comes from the physician. 
Again, the implications and consequences of different ingredients 
contained in a drug are not easily understood; only few physicians 
can acquire the full information (which involves costs). Given the 
high risks of information failure, third party reimbursement plan 
(insurance) are often operated. The combination of physician decision 
making, imperfect information and third party payment makes drug 
demand stronger and less price-elastic than it might otherwise be. 
This confers considerable monopoly on the seller. 
Secondly, in order for a patient to benefit from a newly-
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developed drug, il is necessary that the physician will understand its 
therapeutic value. Creating an awareness of the benefits of such a 
product requires a substantial investment of both time and capital. 
This involves preparation and distribution of literature, conducting 
seminars and symposiums etc. All these costs including sales and 
distribution are often substantial (Laudien, 1986). 
Third, information failures lead to rigorous and careful clinical 
testing before the drug is finally approved and marketed. There is 
huge cost difference between pre-clinical research costs (including 
unsuccessful development projects) and costs of successful drugs 
(which includes research, development and testing outlays, including 
the cost of failure) (Scherer, 1993). More importantly, the average 
time required to bring a drug from the start of clinical trials (i.e. the 
date when patent is available) to the approval of the relevant authority 
is often lengthy. This reduces the effective period forpatent protection. 
This makes it more difficult for the innovating companies to recoup 
the rising R&D costs (including costs of clinical test, distribution and 
marketing). In fact, even when the patent period expires and the 
original firms are to compete with the most generic imitators, the 
original firms have to continue expenses on testing to keep up their 
reputation. Thus new drug development is becoming a high-stake, 
high-risk game. This might discourage new drug development 
adversely. It calls for extending patent period so as to maintain the 
effective period. It is also suggested that there should be some 
provision to test the standard and quality of the generic substitutes. 
In the past foreign pharmaceutical companies were willing to invest 
in and supply new drugs although adequate patents did not exist. 
Usually they were able to recover all costs and reap profits since it 
would take several years for a generic product to appear in the 
market. Naturally these generic products are much cheaper because 
the imitator does not need to recover the costs of R&D (including the 
failure). Inprice sensitive countries, generic products, once introduced, 
.i: id £ ni 23 
quickly capture the market from the original innovator's brand. 
Nowadays the drug manufacturers in the developing countnes are 
quite competent to copy innovative products within few months. So 
the companies developing the new products are no longer able to 
recover all costs and make sufficient profits that otherw.se could give 
incentives for further invention. This would affect technology transfer 
and distribution of products in the developing countnes adversely. 
These countries, instead of patent protection, are unlikely to get 
access to the information of newly developed drugs. 
With regard to the question of price implication of the branded 
products after the expiry of patent right one may expect that when the 
aeneric drugs will be available in the market along with the branded 
product,thepricecompetitionbetweenbranded and genenc suppliers 
should lead to lower prices. This, however, may not always be the 
case; branded drug prices might even go up. This is because the 
individual physicians tend to be risk-averse, cost insensitive and 
creatures of habit, prescribing drugs by brand name, even when less 
expensive generic substitutes are available. Also consumers 
purchasing drugs at retail pharmacy normally lack knowledge 
sufficient to evaluate the alternatives and risks of substituting away 
from a prescribed brandname drug, even when the state law permits 
or encourages generic substitutes. (See Scherer, 1993, for further 
details) In the context of the world economy the buyers can be 
grouped into different income classes. When there is only one 
branded product, the pricing problem is straightforward. Once genenc 
substitutes are available at lower prices, the whole market is bifurcated. 
The incumbent branded seller might find it more profitable to supply 
at higher price in the price-insensitive market than serving to all 
customers (Frank and Salkener, 1992, and Marjit and Kabiraj, 1993). 
The price of any product in a market depends on what the consumer 
can afford. So a low price in a low-income country and a high pnce 
in a high-income country are mutually consistent. 
24 
We arc now in a position to explain why drug prices in India arc 
relatively low. Given that our ability to imitate has increased 
tremendously, we are in a position to develop generic substitutes 
within a very short time, we have no consumers' Act so far. So 
without proper clinical test the products are being marketed, and the 
physicians face little risk in prescribing these generic products (so 
third party payment system is not developed). Also in our country, 
distribution and sales costs are by far the lowest. Low per capita 
income in general leads to the demand for generic products, and 
competition among generic substitutes tends to lower prices as well. 
Moreover, the Indian Government has followed drug price control 
measures for a long time under the Essential Commodities Act. 
One may, however, reasonably question as to what extent price 
control measures have promoted cost effective healthcare for the 
ultimate consumers. It is said that price control policies have been 
counter-productive for the industry without any substantial gain to 
the consumers (see the Cover Story in Capital Market, December 5, 
1993, pp. 11-14). It may be argued that Indian drug prices are low 
because the indian drug industry is under an extremely irrational 
price control system (Thomas, 1993). Compared to high cost of 
capital and inflation, the return on capital investment is too low (2% 
approx.) to make innovative research worth-taking. If controls are 
withdrawn, the prices will go up to more rational levels, which is 
likely to promote basic research. 
One contentious issue in this context relates to the question of 
turnover of the patented drugs in the the country. It has been widely 
held that only 5 to 10% of the commonly used drugs are under patent 
at any point of time. This means, 90 to 95% are outside the patents. 
For example, out of two hundred seventy drugs in the WHO list of 
essential drugs, only 10% are under patent (Thomas, 1993). In such 
situation it is not clear that monopoly exploitation will be too 
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severe.There are lots of substitute products available at a point of 
time, and only few of them are patented. Consumers might have 
many choices. So it is not that a company, because it has got a patent, 
can charge any price it wishes. There are a lot of other powers of the 
government to intervene and curb the behaviour of the firm. 
It is, however, argued on the other side that when it is claimed 
that only 10% arc patented drugs in the country, the list includes all 
non-essential medicines like balms and vitamins (Keayla and Dhar, 
1993), however, if one considers important therapeutic groups, the 
share of patented drugs in the country might be substantial. So it calls 
for further study before making any conclusion in this matter. 
While the politicians and economists are sharply divided on the 
question of possible effects ofTRIPs, many of the Indian industrialists 
arc not perturbed (CapitalMarket, 1993). Given the transitional period, 
product patenting will be implemented after 10 years. Also all the 
drug manufacturers will not be covered by patent. They are, in fact, 
chalking out plans to manufacture as many new products as possible. 
Patent protection should .not prevent them from materialising a 
decent growth rate at least for this decade. However, as restrictions 
and controls will be withdrawn, they will be exposed to foreign 
competition. So the question remains: to what extent can Indian firms 
maintain their competitive advantage? 
6. Conclusion 
One unique feature of the Uruguay Round talks under GATT is 
the inclusion of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, 
or TRIPs. The objective, stated in the Dunkel Draft Text, reads as 
follows: 
The protection and enforcement of IPRs should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
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producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations. It is also stated that parties 
may, in formulating or amending their national laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health 
and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of 
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provision of this agreement. 
So far this goes, this is all good. However, this proviso restriction 
raises eyebrows on the question, to what extent the technologically 
poor countries will benefit in the new international set-up. Even 
within the third world group, countries differ widely in respect of 
resource endowment, education, technical ability, and research and 
development. Then it is quite natural that the dividend will not be 
equally divided, and the economically powerful nations will get the 
larger share of the world trade pie. Costa (1988) remarks that in an 
unequal world, any attempt to make intellectual property norms 
uniform would lead, in practice, to perpetuating the world's uneven 
division of knowledge and information resources. 
There are few attempts to estimate gains and losses of different 
countries in this set-up. For example, following OECD figures j t is 
estimated that full implementation of the Uruguay Round would lift 
growth in the E.C. and Japan by 1.7 per cent by 2002, against only 0.4 
per cent for the U.S.A. The newly industrialised economies of Asia, 
including the rapidly expanding China, stand to be the biggest 
beneficiaries. Some developing countries, such as Indonesia, are 
expected to suffer economic loss because of the expected shift in 
terms of agricultural trade (Statesman, December 15,1993, Calcutta). 
Our analysis, however, seeks to provide only directions of the 
consequences. Countries particularly lagging in R & D are anxious 
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because of the fact that international intellectual property protection 
in pharmaceuticals, food and agricultural products is likely to affect 
the poor. The other issues in the Dunkel Draft such as greater market 
access, liberalising trade in services, trade-related investment measures 
etc. have also led to numerous discussions in India and elsewhere. All 
these have implications in domestic R & D , technology transfer and 
attaining self-sufficiency in technology and trade matters.To the 
extentthatthenewGATT rules legalise the powerof the multinationals 
internationally, the local LDC government will not be able to 
discriminate between a domestic firm over which it has some control 
and a transnational corporation over which it has little control. This 
willaffectpublicstrategiesinrespectoflocal resource useand choice 
of technology. Bagchi (1994) provides a historical evaluation of the 
new GATT treaty. 
We understand the rationale behind protection of intellectual 
properties. But the question that can be raised is whether a country 
has the liberty to keep up its national interests. And if the interests of 
the developing countries do not tally with that of the developed 
countries, whose interests are to be looked for by multilateral 
organizations like the GATT ? While the GATT negotiations were 
on, we observed some powerful countries forming trade blocs such 
as NAFTA. The GATT proposals called for 'trade creation', but this 
is an act of 'trade diversion', and it violates the basic principle of 
GATT. If this trend goes on unchecked, the future of the international 
order will belong to selective groupings of nation states in rigid trade 
blocs rather than to the grand concept of multilateralism based on the 
ideas of the United Nations system.We are, however, yet to be 
convinced to what extent the setting up of the World Trade 
Organisation within the new GATT rules will mitigate the threat 
of unilateral retaliatory trade sanction as under the U S Law of 
Super 301. 
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We have argued in the paper that TRIPs under GATT calls for 
far- reaching changes in the institutional setup and patent legislation 
system of many countries. The economic reforms China has introduced 
in the 1980s are largely in the direction ofTRIPs. In a sense China has 
already accepted the Dunkel proposals. It is to be mentioned here that 
China, though not a GATT member till date, joined the Paris 
Convention for the protection of industrial property, and at present 
she is desperately seeking entry into the GATT. Now, noting Chinese 
economic performance in the recent years and looking at her interest 
in TRIPs, one might be prone to suggest that developing countries 
should follow the Chinese model on patent laws and enactment. But 
the study by Paulwitz(1993) shows that so far the Chinese patent 
system has not performed well enough to encourage domestic 
inventive and innovative activities and to intensify foreign 
collaboration in the technology sector. The introduction of a national 
patent system can contribute towards technological development in 
the country only if it is part of a package of economic policy measures 
aimed at creating necessary operative conditions. In China, perhaps 
such a link is not well documented. 
In India, already considerable discussion has taken place on the 
general issue of patent laws and TRIPs under the new GATT treaty. 
One set of arguments directed against the agreement on TRIPs relates 
to the implied change that is needed in the Indian patent legislation. 
And the other set of arguments seeks to dissect implications ofTRIPs 
rules. It is argued that new GATT rules involve infringement of 
national sovereignty in important areas such as agriculture, services, 
pharmaceuticals and food grains. Granting product patent in all fields, 
will affect indigenous R & D adversely. Extending the scope of 
patentability to life forms will disrupt technological development in 
the field of biotechnology. Also patent protection to plant and seed 
varieties will lead to dominance in agriculture by multinational 
corporations. However, India is likely to gain from the amendment 
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of multi-fibre agreement. Since 1974 imports by industrialised 
countries including the USA have been subject to quota restrictions. 
Also high tariffs are imposed so far, putting the developing countries 
at a disadvantage. Under GATT an enlargement of quotas and the 
phasing out of the multi-fibre agreement over time should lower 
import prices of textiles and clothing, and improve labour intensive 
exports for the developing countries like India. While there is a lot of 
exaggeration about the supposed increase in drug prices, there is no 
doubt that prices of at least the patented drugs will rise. But there is 
no reason why prices of other drugs will rise in the short run. To the 
extent patent protection stimulates more R & D , prices of many drugs 
should fall in the long run. 
It should be mentioned that the Uruguay Round talks on IPRs 
cover seven different forms of property rights, including patent, 
copyrights, trademarks, industrial design, etc.; excepting rules on 
patent protection, India had accepted international norms and standards 
of intellectual property rights. Of course, dissension of opinion did 
appear on the question of enforcement mechanism. As mentioned 
earlier, many developing countries, including China, have already 
accepted the Dunkel proposals as a basis for formulating TRIPs 
legislation, even on patents for drugs and chemicals. Consequently, 
India finds little international support in her favour. One can hardly 
dare suggest India to be out of the GATT because the cost of being 
isolated in the international context may be too high. In such a 
situation, accepting Dunkel rules might be the self- immiserization 
choice for India. One might even argue that India should perhaps find 
greater safety in multilateralism - there would be a greater loss of 
sovereignty if India had to negotiate alone with the USA or other 
trade blocs. 
Whether India should accept the Sutherland treaty(and its TRIPs 
provisions in particular), is no doubt, the most debated issue of the 
recent times. In deciding this question the experience with the Indian 
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paient system prevalent at present should be critically reviewed. It is 
true that die Indian Patents Act 1970 gave advantage to Indian firms 
and innovators in the 'national interests'. Then why did so far most 
of the Indian firms and innovators perform so badly? Why have we, 
after 40 years of planning, only less than 0.5 per cent share of global 
trade? Why have we failed to boost our R & D efforts in a meaningful 
direction? Why did not the 1970 Act increase domestic-to-foreign 
patent grant ratio significantly, and why was only an insignificant 
portion of domestic patent grants ultimately used commercially? The 
number of patent applications filed in India by Indian organizations 
remained more or less static at 1120 in 1969,1124 in 1979 and 1077 
in 1989, and not even 10% of these applications lead to commercially 
worthwhile new products (see the article on 'Dunkel Draft' by 
Abhijit Sen, Statesman, December 27,1993). India could otherwise 
reap this benefit from the new GATT rules had her R & D 
expenditure of Rs 4,000 crores per annum in various government 
laboratories been productively used. Moreover, depending on copying 
of foreign technologies for ever cannot be a suggestive policy for an 
economy like India. India should not depend on international piracy 
of intellectual properties. Once GATT has been signed, can we not 
accept the challenge of international norms on the subject while at the 
same time taking steps to make the national R& D more productive? 
Given her large potential domestic market and cheaper resource 
endowment and manpower, India might successfully negotiate the 
setting up production and R & D plants in the home country. In a 
world of unequal political and economic power structure, given that 
GATT is entrusted to the task of ensuring free non- discriminatory 
and equitable trade, we can strive and find out ways and means for 
making the maximum gain from the GATT outcomes. Today's 
signing of GATT is not the end but should be regarded as the 
beginning of future negotiations. 
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